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A Transnational Actor on a Dramatic
Stage – Sir Ivor Jennings and the
Manipulation of Westminster Style
Democracy: The Case of Pakistan
H. Kumarasingham*
Across first Asia and then Africa new states rose from colonial rule
in the post-war era that sought to build New Westminster constitutions.
The Westminster model was the transnational trend after 1945 in
constitution-making for much of the world emerging from colonial rule and
was promoted by the Colonial Office, Indigenous leaders and constitutional
advisers such as the ubiquitous Sir Ivor Jennings. However, this flexible
and ambiguous regime type caused many political and constitutional crises
that questioned the wisdom of applying Westminster to these states. Jennings
worked across Africa and Asia including in Ceylon, Nepal, Malaya,
Singapore, the Maldives, Sudan, Ethiopia, South Africa, and the
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. It is Pakistan, however, that sticks
out as Jennings’s most controversial role where he effectively, legally and
politically, contentiously defended a “constitutional coup” by the GovernorGeneral against the Constituent Assembly in 1954. The case also serves to
demonstrate how the manipulation and divisive interpretations of
Westminster conventions and institutions in the first decade of Pakistan led
to the breakdown of democracy and laid conspicuous precedents for
dictatorship and military rule, which have explanatory value in
understanding the country’s prevalent fragility in embedding accountability
and democracy.
“[W]e shall have to go far back in history and to trace the origin and
subsequent development of the British Empire itself.”1 So stated the opinion of the
Chief Justice of Pakistan, Muhammad Munir, when searching for the legal
justification of the controversial dissolution of the Constituent Assembly on
October 24, 1954 by the Governor-General to forestall the adoption a new
constitution that would have curbed his powers. In a context where the country was

Lecturer in Politics, University of Edinburgh.
1. Federation of Pakistan v. Moulvi T. Khan, (1955) 240 PLD (SC) (Pak.).
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attempting to craft a republic based on Islamic principles in South Asia, the case
and crisis it passed judgment on relied on templates from the settler states where
few Muslims resided. Decisions and actions of English monarchs stretching back
to the seventeenth century were employed. It was Halsbury’s, not Hammurabi’s
laws that guided the proceedings.2 It remains the most dramatic court case in
Pakistani history following one of the most controversial constitutional crises in the
common law world. Sir Ivor Jennings believed the case “dealt with fundamental
principles of constitutional law of interest throughout the Commonwealth.”3
Jennings would know. Not only was he the world’s foremost expert on the
constitutions of the Commonwealth at the time, he also played a direct role in
Pakistan as adviser, advocate and author of critical legal, political, and academic
writings on the crisis. Many Pakistani scholars angrily denounce the crisis as the real
beginning of that country’s descent into dictatorship and its ruling elites’ enduring
attraction to martial rule.
Jennings, as the Governor-General’s adviser, colluded to ex post facto justify
a constitutional coup d’état that crushed democratic saplings, ridiculed the rule of
law, and exposed the dangers of adopting the Westminster model and the
conventions and prerogatives that came with it.4 As a constitution-maker of
transnational influence and scope, the role of Jennings in Pakistan provides an
insight into how selective precedents and interpretations from across the British
Empire and Commonwealth were used to justify what appeared unjustifiable. In
turn, the “Pakistan Formula,” as Jennings confidentially called his contentious fix
there, was drawn upon for other states around the world that he advised—primarily,
as was the case in Pakistan, to frustrate, if not suspend, the will of parliament to the
advantage of unelected elites.5 The actions of Jennings in Pakistan, using Halliday
and Shaffer’s Transnational Legal Order definition, are that of an actor who, with
the wilful cooperation of bureaucratic and judicial officers, authoritatively forged
the understanding and practice of transnational common law for employment in
Pakistan. The consequences of this enhanced a socio-legal environment that dented
the rule of law and re-orientated it towards more illiberal “behavioural” ends and
impacting on legal orders in the country ever since.6
Sir Ivor Jennings was one of the twentieth century’s most influential
constitutional scholars and became, from the 1940s till his death in 1965, one of its
most established “constitution-makers.”7 Before the term was employed, Jennings

2. Multiple editions of Halsbury were used in these cases before the Pakistani courts.
3. IVOR JENNINGS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS IN PAKISTAN vii (1957).
4. H. Kumarasingham, Exporting Executive Accountability? Westminster Legacies of Executive Power,
66(3) PARL. AFF. 579 (2013).
5. For example in Nepal.
6. See, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 8-11 (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2015).
7. See generally H. KUMARASINGHAM, CONSTITUTION-MAKER: SELECTED WRITINGS OF SIR
IVOR JENNINGS (2015); H. KUMARASINGHAM, CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN ASIA –
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was undoubtedly transnational in his scholarship and had near omnipresence across
the British world. The vast British domains in Asia proved his most important and
significant arena for constitution-making.8 Starting from his arrival in Colombo in
March 1941, to head what would become the University of Ceylon, he soon became
an unofficial adviser to D.S. Senanayake, the preeminent political leader in the island
destined to be its first prime minster. Jennings, with Senanayake and the local
panjandrum, O.E. Goonetilleke, formed the “nucleus of a Reforms Ministry.” Here
the new Vice-Chancellor acted as the constitutional adviser “on tap” giving
expertise that unquestionably improved Ceylon’s (and especially Senanayake’s)
case.9 This famous trio relied on each other and, with near exclusivity, conducted
and formulated the Ceylon side of the negotiations with the British. Jennings, just
thirty-eight when he arrived, played a major role in the articulation of Ceylon’s
independence demands and relished it. Jennings’s role went well beyond the
academic and ventured into the political. It was a role he craved, but also one that
elicited jealousy and deep suspicion as to how much this Englishman was
influencing high politics, especially when not only the citizenry, but even the leading
local politicians were kept out of deciding Ceylon’s future. Jennings had, in fact, no
formal role. As he admitted “Officially I did not exist.”10 Official or not, locals noted
his presence and sway.11 Prominent Ceylonese journalist Mervyn de Silva
sardonically penned a portrait of Jennings in the press, which some Pakistanis could
well have recognized.
As Vice-Chancellor Jennings went from success to success in this country,
from Commission to Commission, and finally to the exalted position of
one of the architects of Ceylon’s independence, and thence to a
knighthood, the patronising air with which he looked upon the campus
was extended to cover the whole nation. And when, with Ceylon as a base,
his influence broadened out to cover neighbouring countries Pakistan,
Malaya, the Maldives which consulted him on constitutional matters, he
found it possible to patronise a whole continent. It is a fact that at least
two of these countries have been riddled with constitutional crises and
catastrophes since Sir Ivor left their shores. But to match Sir Ivor’s own
manifest modesty if for no other reason, we refuse to credit our ex-ViceChancellor with responsibility for these historic events!12
The “immature democracies”13 of Asia, as Jennings termed them, nonetheless
sought his counsel and he became, from Punjab to Penang, an Asian transnational
DECOLONISATION AND STATE-BUILDING IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 173-94
(2016) (for an introduction on Jennings’ life and this aspect of his career).
8. See generally H. KUMARASINGHAM, CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN ASIA – DECOLONISATION
AND STATE-BUILDING IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 1-35 (2016).
9.
H. KUMARASINGHAM, THE ROAD TO TEMPLE TREES: SIR IVOR JENNINGS AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF CEYLON: SELECTED WRITINGS 10 (2015).
10. Id. at 16.
11. Id. at xxvi-xxvii
12. KUMARASINGHAM, supra note 9, at xxvi-xxvii.
13. IVOR JENNINGS, THE APPROACH TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 32 (1956).
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constitution-maker and adviser. Jennings was well regarded and employed for three
main reasons. First, he had the reputation as the preeminent expert on
Commonwealth constitutions with several of his major (and best) publications
completed before the Second World War. Second, he had substantial experience in
Asia as Ceylon’s Vice-Chancellor 1941-55 and university business across the region.
He was also known to some of the leaders and leading lawyers of the region in an
era that was flush with Oxbridge men. Finally, he was very hardworking and had
form in getting things done quickly, however thorny the situation. His ability and
versatility to draw upon the constitutional wealth of British and Imperial precedents
was legendary. This pleased the elites who dominated the upper echelons of Asian
states and who employed Jennings to give a solution with the imprimatur of a British
academic who was not in the pocket of Her Majesty’s Government.
The constitutional form the Westminster model afforded enabled multifarious
versions and styles to sprout globally. Westminster consciously avoided rigid
constitutional and institutional forms and instead nurtured convention and context
to provide the constitutional order.14 While not the determining political factor in
the crises that will be detailed below in Pakistan, Westminster-style government was
nonetheless a regime-type, with its deliberate ambiguity and tacit assumptions, that
greatly assisted the actions and objectives of the Pakistani elite in retarding
democracy and for Ivor Jennings to creatively give legal cover for them.
Transnational legal expertise was critically deployed for narrow national political
ends. Jennings was able to draw on common law and Commonwealth political
history to service the needs of the Pakistani establishment, despite the unlikely and
unsuitable transferability of much of his advice for the major political crises that
confronted the young state.
The Indian Independence Act of 1947, which crafted the Pakistani state,
facilitated a Constituent Assembly to sit and create a constitution for the Dominion.
As Alan Gledhill put it, while “India succeeded to the capital, the instrumentalities,
and the accommodation of the central government, Pakistan had to improvise.”15
An example of this was when M.A. Jinnah, who was the unquestionable founder of
Pakistan, became, without precedent, both Governor-General and President of the
Assembly. Pakistani politicians and the population accepted and often revered
Jinnah as the Quaid-i-Azam, the great leader, and did not question this
concentration of power and influence. In contrast to every other part of the
Commonwealth at that time, and with no other twentieth century example, the
Crown in Pakistan and its representative were endowed with critical political power.
This power was supplemented by the ambiguous conventions surrounding the
office, giving ample ground to interpret awesome authority unheard of in any other
Westminster style state. Pakistan was no dictatorship in 1947, however, and it was
believed that its exceptional creation allowed for exceptional actions from its creator
14. Kumarasingham, supra note 4.
15. ALAN GLEDHILL, PAKISTAN – THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS LAWS AND CONSTITUTION
65 (1957).
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to cement the foundations and interests of the state. This context allowed
extraordinary political power in the hands of the Governor-General. Jinnah chaired
and directed Cabinet, instructed provincial governors, and gave orders to the civil
and military services. This was not meant to carry on after Jinnah’s death in
September 1948—just over a year after independence.16 Nonetheless precedents
and personalities existed for the dramas of 1954.
Constitution-making in Pakistan was a very lackluster affair compared to
constitution-making in India.17 The Assembly hardly concerned itself with its
constitution-making task. In the first fourteen of its sixteen sessions, it only
managed to clock up fifty-seven days between 1947 and 1953.18 Instead, much of
the real political activity occurred beyond the legislature at the desks of the
bureaucracy, canteens of the officers’ mess and the Governor-General’s residence.
Political parties were largely incidental. The Muslim League, once the great minority
party of undivided India, began to crack under the pressures and fissions of the new
Pakistan’s ethnic and linguistic diversity and struggle with the factionalism and
impatience that political leaders had for party democracy. As Andrew Harding has
argued, the two-party system was meant to be part of the Westminster export
model, but was rarely found anywhere, especially in Asia.19 Into the breach were old
institutions of the Raj now largely manned by local elites. Viceregalism was in vogue,
evoking the “oriental despotism” of India’s viceroys, and colonial era practices not
only continued, but were often accentuated. Even viceroys during the Colonial era
were restrained by the India Office and Parliament in London. Evidence of
accentuation and the non-party executive constellation that ruled the country can
be seen with the former Indian Civil Servant Ghulam Mohammed, GovernorGeneral since 1951, openly sacking the Muslim League party Prime Minister,
Khwaja Nazimuddin, due to policy and personal differences in April 1953 without
advice and without reference to the legislature where the Prime Minister claimed a
majority. Nazimuddin, himself a former Governor-General, was replaced by a nonpolitician, Mohammed Ali Bogra, who was then serving as Ambassador to
Washington, and was expected to carry out the wishes of the bureaucratic-military
axis, which he largely did. The Governor-General instructed the Law Minister to
issue a statement to quell constitutional mutterings attaching “undue emphasis on
certain conventions as they are known to the British constitutional practice.”20
Most, however, were very pleased with the action since the government had grown
unpopular and had lost control of East Pakistan. The American Ambassador
reported to Washington that the Governor-General’s action against Nazimuddin
16. See Ayesha Jalal, Inheriting the Raj: Jinnah and the Governor-Generalship Issue, 19 MOD. ASIAN
STUD. 29 (1985).
17. See H. KUMARASINGHAM, A POLITICAL LEGACY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 25-45 (2013).
18. KEITH CALLARD, PAKISTAN: A POLITICAL STUDY 80 (1957).
19. Andrew Harding, The Westminster Model Constitution Overseas: Transplantation, Adaptation and
Development in Commonwealth States, 4 OXFORD U. COMMONWEALTH L. J. 160 (2004).
20. ALLEN MCGRATH, THE DESTRUCTION OF PAKISTAN’S DEMOCRACY 98 (Oxford Univ.
Press 1996).
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was “one of the most popular coups in history.”21 A coup nonetheless, and one that
breached not the law, but convention.
Sir Ivor Jennings noted of the dismissal that “on all British precedents, this
action was completely unjustifiable . . . .”22 Nonetheless the Cambridge-educated
public law scholar had been selected in July 1954 to advise the Constituent
Assembly. His name had been discussed since the idea of Pakistan became a
reality.23 Despite not having explicit expertise on Pakistan, he was selected. Indeed
he confessed to the Secretary of the Ministry of Law and fellow Englishman, Sir
Edward Snelson, after receiving a request to help advise the Governor-General, that
he was not “sufficiently familiar with the law of Pakistan to advise what legal form
proceedings should take.”24 Jennings prided himself, however, on his adaptability:
“[c]learly one cannot sit in the Constituent Assembly Building in Murree or Karachi
and draft a Constitution for the Gold Coast. There are, however, common elements
which make it possible to at least define the problem.”25 The new Prime Minister
expressed to the population in a broadcast on April 1, 1954, that Pakistan was
“being advised by Sir Ivor Jennings, one the greatest constitutional authorities in
the world.”26 Providing advice on constitutional matters, as he had already done
around the world, could have been a rather normal role for Jennings. However, in
Pakistan it was not his role as constitutional adviser to the Assembly which draws
the focus of this article, but instead his highly secretive and crafty role in advising
the Governor-General and bureaucracy on the dissolution of the constituent
assembly and the subsequent political and legal justifications of a power most
scholars and lawyers believed the Crown no longer possessed and did not exist in
Pakistan.27 This role, therefore, compelled Jennings to find defenses, precedents,
and prevarications that only someone of his immense transnational and comparative
knowledge of constitutional practices across the world could bring to the rescue of
what even he thought unlawful.

21. Id. at 97.
22. See KUMARASINGHAM, supra note 8, at 136.
23. His name for example was mentioned for the role as early as 4 July 1947. See 3 QUID-IAZAM MOHAMMAD ALI JINNAH, Z. H. ZAIDI, JINNAH PAPERS: ON THE THRESHOLD OF PAKISTAN
85 (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan 1996) (correspondence from H. L. Ismay to Liaquat Ali Khan,
4 July 1947, F. 2/175).
24. See Sir Ivor Jennings Papers, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London,
Jennings to Snelson, at ICS 125/BXV/4 (10 Nov. 1954).
25. IVOR JENNINGS, THE APPROACH TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 11 (1956).
26.
S.S. PIRZADA, DISSOLUTION OF CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF PAKISTAN AND THE
LEGAL BATTLES OF MOULVI TAMIZUDDIN KHAN 42 (Asia L. House 1995). Sir Kenneth RobertsWray, Legal Adviser to the Colonial Office and later author of COMMONWEALTH AND COLONIAL
LAW (1966) for one did not have a high opinion of Jennings and considered his draft constitution for
Ceylon “quite useless” – an opinion he repeated in 1956 when Jennings was about to go to Malaya as
part of the Reid Commission. See KUMARASINGHAM, supra note 8, at 9; A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE END OF EMPIRE: BRITAIN AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
859 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001); See also KUMARASINGHAM, supra note 9.
27. See MCGRATH, supra note 20.
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There is . . . no power in GOI [Government of India] Act to dissolve the
Federal Legislature. It was in GOI Act s. 19, but was removed in 1947.
Nor is there power to dissolve CA in I.I. [India Independence] Act. In
other words, this is a revolutionary act . . . This illustrates the general
principle that an act of illegality compels other acts of illegality.28
However, this did not perturb Jennings, who afterwards would even admire
his own legal finesse: “[t]here is no provision in the Government of India Act for
the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. The action taken was therefore both
unconstitutional and illegal. This raised certain problems, which seem to have been
solved at least temporarily with considerable success.”29 As Paula Newberg argues,
these years where Jennings operated showed a period that “took refuge in the
presumed impartiality of inherited constitutional instruments without recognizing
their deficiencies and structural partialities” with disastrous consequences for future
constitution-making.30 Jennings was no creature of the Pakistani elite; he knew what
he was doing and the local elite knew whom they were employing. This was not a
neo-colonial plot to destabilize a non-western state, though there were political
gains for Pakistan’s Anglo-Saxon allies, but instead an example of internal political
machinations given extra fuel from external actors like Jennings. Arguably the crises
and its immediate outcome legitimized both Jennings and the Pakistani
establishment that directed him. The Queen, on the advice of her Pakistani
ministers, even felt emboldened to make Jennings a Knight Commander of the
Most Excellent Order of the British Empire at the end of his mission in the country,
and he would go on to collect further academic and national honors with his advice
sought from Nigeria to New Zealand.31 Pakistan’s rulers no doubt congratulated
themselves that their coup against parliamentary democracy was not only defended
by Jennings but lauded in the international press. In London the oldest journal of
international affairs, The Round Table, congratulated the governor-general from
“stopping the rot” by dissolving the “irresponsible” Constituent Assembly and
concluded that the “common man and the country have suffered long; and if we
now have people at the helm of affairs who we know are clear in their visions and
have honesty of purpose we are inclined to wish them god-speed and forget
everything else.”32
Looking at the crisis and the context surrounding the dissolution, it is evident
how much the Westminster system was being used and interpreted in different ways
to suit the Pakistani elites’ purposes. The Westminster model became, as Woodrow
Wilson predicted, the “world’s fashion,” especially after 1945.33 However, as A.F.
28.
29.
30.

See supra note 24, Revolution in Pakistan, at ICS 125/B/15/6 (25 Oct. 1954).
Kumarasingham, supra note 4, at 132.
PAULA R. NEWBERG, JUDGING THE STATE: COURTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS
IN PAKISTAN 65 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2002).
31. KUMARASINGHAM, supra note 9, at 3.
32. The Crisis in Pakistan, 44 ROUND TABLE 50 (1954).
33. Pippa Norris, The Twilight of Westminster? Electoral Reform and its Consequences, 49 POL. STUD.,
no. 4, at 877 (2000); H. Kumarasingham, Eastminster – Decolonisation and State-Building in British Asia, in
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Madden reminds us, countless British colonial reports, statesmen, and officials
counselled strongly against the suitability of Westminster as transnational regime
type.34 Most in Whitehall till the twentieth century shared the view of the
redoubtable senior nineteenth century Colonial Office mandarin, James Stephen,
that to create “miniature” British constitutions across the world, especially for
places with substantial non-European populations, was “the grossest of
absurdities.”35 The 1930 Simon Report into Indian constitutional reform perceived
the experiment in introducing Westminster to the East as dangerous. “The
introduction into an oriental country, with a long history of autocracy, of methods
of self-government evolved during centuries of experiments by a Western nation
for its own conditions and people was a momentous and even hazardous
enterprise.”36
Nonetheless, for much of the twentieth century, the Westminster model
travelled far and wide, not as an imposed form of constitution-making, but instead
as one that both British and indigenous politicians desired in order to achieve
ambitions of geopolitical connection, a belief that this system was the best and most
understood, and local intentions to wrest away the awesome power of the colonial
state into their waiting hands.37 As De Smith argues, another characteristic which
critically made this all possible and enabled the system’s export to far corners of the
globe of improbable suitability was that “uniformity is neither sought nor
achieved.”38 Conventions were critical therefore, but this still meant that for those
across the world that chose Westminster style government the “dichotomy of law
and convention was preserved, and most of the really important conventions were
left to the interpolator.”39
Ivor Jennings was, and remains, one of the most critical sources on British and
Commonwealth conventions and in some cases was not just advising or read on the
subject, but became its “interpolator” himself, critically so in the case of Pakistan.
Famously he opined that in the Westminster system conventions were “the flesh
which clothes the dry bones of the law.”40 Transnational constitution-making in
such a style of government was far from a rigid and mechanical transferal. Instead,
conventions for one constitution were anathema for others—despite having
comparable institutions and origins. The conventions that surrounded the Crown
CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN ASIA: DECOLONISATION AND STATE-BUILDING IN THE
OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 9, 10-11 (H. Kumarasingham ed., 2016).

AFTERMATH

34. A.F. Madden, ‘Not for Export’: The Westminster Model of Government and British Colonial Practice,
8 J. Imperial & Commonwealth Hist. 19 (1979).
35. Id.
36. INDIAN STATUTORY COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE INDIAN STATUTORY COMMISSION
VOLUME II—RECOMMENDATIONS CMD. 3569, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF OUR PROPOSALS 4
(1930).
37. S.A. De Smith, Westminster’s Export Models: The Legal Framework of Responsible Government, J.
COMMONWEALTH POL. STUD. 4 (1961).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. IVOR JENNINGS, THE LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 81 (5th ed. 1959).
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were a bone of contention in Pakistan throughout the 1947-1956 period when it
was a Dominion with a Governor-General representing the monarch in
Buckingham Palace. The Westminster model often experienced “dyarchical
malfunctions” in Asia.41 The critical position of Head of State in Asia was rarely
ceremonial and apolitical as Westminster convention dictates; instead, the
Eastminsters of Asia took on a major “deviation” from the settler cases.42 Asian
heads of state routinely interfered in politics, wielded significant executive power,
frustrated policy, and had a very different definition of the Westminster maxim of
“responsible advice.”43
This central element of Westminster government faced problematic
transnational translation; it forms the crux of the crisis and where Ivor Jennings,
constitution-maker par excellence, played a formidable role in bringing down the
constitutional order of Pakistan. As W.J.M. Mackenzie observed on the task of
constitution-making, “[a] lawyer’s constitution is dead until it strikes roots in the
political soil.”44 Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton argue in their wide-ranging survey on
the content of authoritarian constitutions that not only are there “few systematic
differences across the formal constitutions of democracies and dictatorships,” but
instead the “most important determinants of constitutional form are the era and the
region in which the constitution was written and the set of institutions chosen for
the first constitution in the country’s history.”45 A difficulty of transnationalism in
a legal framework is, as Jothie Rajah argues, that it risks homogenising and can
perpetuate “notions of nation as the unproblematic vehicle of sovereign equality.”46
This is especially problematic when there are nations and states subsequent to the
“Westphalian moment,” namely the post-colonial variety.47 Pakistan was about to
cultivate its democratic constitution for one more resembling dictatorship thanks to
the ambiguity of the Westminster model and the ingenuity of Ivor Jennings.
Since July 1954, Jennings had been advising the Constituent Assembly to
devise a new constitution. Since the tabling of Basic Principles in 1949 by thenPrime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan had the aim of becoming a republic with
Islamic character.48 As mentioned above, the Assembly, as a constitution-making
body, was very desultory. The activity increased in its last two sessions when the
Assembly was finally framing a new constitution. The total days spent as a
41.
42.
43.
44.

Harding, supra note 19, at 159.
See Kumarasingham, supra note 33, at 16-19.
Id.
W.J.M. MACKENZIE, Constitution Making, in EXPLORATIONS IN GOVERNMENT –
COLLECTED PAPERS 1951-1968, 252, 260 (Palgrave Macmillan 1975).
45. ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., The Content of Authoritarian Constitutions, in CONSTITUTIONS IN
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 141, 162 (Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser eds., Cambridge Univ. Press
2013).
46. Jothie Rajah, ‘Rule of Law’ as Transnational Legal Order, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS
340, 346-47 (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2015).
47. Id.
48. See G.W. CHOUDHURY, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN PAKISTAN 35-58 (2d ed.,
Longman 1970).

42

UC Irvine Journal of International, Transnational, and Comparative Law [Vol. 2:33

constitution-making body before its dissolution in October 1954 during these last
two sessions was more than the previous fourteen sessions put together—though
still just fifty-nine days.49 Though there were key American constitutional ideas
concerning executive accountability, Jennings observed a preference for English
constitutional practices, many Pakistani legislators resembled the Barons at Merton
in 1236 pronouncing “nolumus leges Angliae mutare”—”we do not want to change the
laws of England.”50 Critically, though, the new constitution explicitly aimed to curb
the powers of the head of state and make legally conspicuous the need for the head
of state to follow advice.51 The dismissal of Nazimuddin the previous year was
clearly on the minds of those in the Assembly. The influential paper Dawn
approvingly carried the headline “Parliament Made Supreme Body.”52 In essence
much of what the Assembly approved on September 21, 1954 was the codifying of
conventions, which would close off opportunities for the Governor-General to act
except on advice of his ministers and the assertion of the supremacy of parliament.
The draft constitution was submitted to Jennings, who made “extensive but minor
changes” and was sent to the Government Printers on October 15, 1954 with the
aim that the country would have a new constitution based on a more stable form of
parliamentary democracy.53 As Geoffrey Marshall argued of Pakistan, “the lawful
seat of sovereignty was in dispute for more than seven years after the Independence
Act of 1947.”54 The Assembly was attempting to clear the constitutional confusion.
Meanwhile Ghulam Muhammad was not impressed and unlikely to accept a
recalibration of his powers that would compel him to act as a traditional
Westminster head of state. Mohammed, Karl Newman contends, “was not only
active, ambitious and somewhat given to intrigue but he was also the product of the
Indian Civil Service with all its traditions of vigorous executive action, especially in
times of crisis or failures of political leadership,” and therefore in the crisis that he
saw in Pakistan felt legitimately emboldened and “left the path of constitutional
government.”55 Pakistan’s military and bureaucracy, including the GovernorGeneral, were keen to cement financial and defense support from the Americans,
who had been wary of the country’s political instability. While in Washington in
September 1953 and afterwards, Ghulam Mohammed, with Ayub Khan and the
backing of Iskander Mirza, both future military rulers, assured American officials in
that critical Cold War climate that Pakistan would be its ally and that it would not
become a “fanatical theocracy,” which apparently the constituent assembly
promoted when recommending the Islamic influence over the constitution. Instead
they would withstand political pressures of “religious zealots” and offered the
49. See KEITH CALLARD, PAKISTAN – A POLITICAL STUDY 80 (George Allen & Unwin 1958).
50. JENNINGS, supra note 13, at 12.
51. G.W. Choudhury, The Constitution of Pakistan, 29 PAC. AFF. 243, 248 (1956).
52. MCGRATH, supra note 20, at 124.
53. Id.
54.
GEOFFREY MARSHALL, PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY AND THE COMMONWEALTH
133 (Clarendon Press 1957).
55. Karl J. Newman, Pakistan’s Preventative Autocracy and Its Causes, 32 PAC. AFF. 18, 24-25 (1959).
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prospect of a “constitutional dictatorship,” which envisioned the GovernorGeneral at the helm with the support of the military and all provinces under
Governor’s rule, except East Bengal, which the military would directly control—in
addition, the Constituent Assembly would be dissolved.56 This indeed was largely
what happened on October 24, 1954. The passing in the Assembly of the draft
constitution alerted Ghulam Muhammad to action. The Governor-General
“scorned the idea of any parliamentary government in Pakistan.”57 As Choudhury
argues, “[t]hough he pretended to favour the American executive system, his real
model was the vice-regal pattern of the British period.”58 With the support of the
military and civil service, and after brow beating the Prime Minister in the early
hours, who was dramatically summoned from Washington, Ghulam Muhammad
acted defiantly and issued a proclamation on October 24, 1954, which extinguished
hopes for Pakistani parliamentary democracy. The defeated acquiescence of
Muhammad Ali Bogra as Prime Minister enabled his puppet-master, Ghulam
Mohammed, to produce someone to take political responsibility for actions the
Prime Minister had no part of and to appease the radical reformation of the cabinet
he supposedly headed.59
The Governor-General having considered the political crisis with which
the country is faced, has with deep regret come to the conclusion that the
constitutional machinery has broken down. He therefore has decided to
declare a state of emergency throughout Pakistan. The Constituent
Assembly as at present constituted has lost confidence of the people and
can no longer function. The ultimate authority vests in the people who will
decide all issues including constitutional issues through their
representatives who are to be elected; fresh elections will be held as early
as possible.60
The Prime Minister, who had only days earlier praised the Assembly for
completing its principal constitution-making task, now felt compelled to announce
to the world: “Constitution-making by the present Constituent Assembly has
56.
See AYESHA JALAL, THE STATE OF MARTIAL RULE: THE ORIGINS OF PAKISTAN’S
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEFENCE 185-87 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1990).
57. Id.
58. CHOUDHURY, supra note 48, at 32.
59. See supra note 24, at ICS 125/BXV/6 (10 Nov. 1954) (Jennings recorded in his diary ‘When
PM Ali arrived in London on 22/10, he was met by Ispaham (H.C.) and Iskander Mirza. They had
arranged for him to leave immediately by RAF Hastings for Cyprus, where a second Hastings was
waiting. For some reason unknown he refused the services of the RAF and, after a delay of four hours,
chartered a BOAC plane. He arrived in Karachi on the night of the 23/11. Two government Hare cars
were waiting, + with them the C. in C. Ali was invited to get into one of the cars, which he did, sitting
between the two generals. When Mrs. Ali tried to follow, she was politely requested to get into the other
car. Ali was whisked off to GH and Mrs. Ali to the PM’s house. Ali was asked to wait downstairs while
the generals talked to GG. He was then sent for + told what GG wanted. He refused to agree. He was
again asked to wait while a further discussion took place. This went on until 2.30 a.m., when he finally
agreed. The impression I got, though I did not exactly say so, was that Ali was given a choice between
agreement and arrest. Next morning the Secretaries were sent for + the Proclamations issued. The new
Ministers were sworn in that night (24/10). From then on, GG and PM have worked together.’)
60. Federation of Pakistan v. Moulvi T. Khan, (1955) 240 PLD (SC) (Pak.).
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resulted in developments which threaten to imperil our national unity. It has
provoked personal, sectional and provincial rivalries and suspicions. These have to
be curbed, and Pakistan’s interests must be put above everything else. This is what
the Governor-General’s action envisages.”61
It was reported that Muhammad Ali Bogra’s acceptance of Ghulam
Muhammad’s invitation to re-form the government meant he was in agreement with
the dramatic actions taken by the Governor-General in his absence abroad.62 The
Times correspondent speculated a day later that:
Pakistan would not be true to herself if not every lawyer was busily rereading constitutional law to define the legality of the action taken by the
Governor-General last Sunday. It is not unlikely that the legal argument
will continue for months, but a recently arrived observer, bemused by
seemingly contradictory acts, sections and clauses, can quickly come to one
conclusion: whatever the Opposition lawyers may have to say – and it
seems it will be unending – Karachi at least has accepted Mr. Ghulam
Muhammad’s intervention calmly and perhaps with relief.63
Time magazine called Ghulam Muhammad the “Reluctant Dictator.”64 The
President of the Constituent Assembly, Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan, disagreed with
the “reluctance” and challenged the dissolution in the Courts.65 Into this context
Ivor Jennings was summoned back. The constitution-maker was to be the
constitution-breaker.
Though the crisis is well known to Pakistani historians and legal scholars (less
so outside of Pakistan), the role of Jennings has never been substantially addressed
or exposed through his papers. The preeminent and most well-known historical and
political account of Pakistan’s road to military rule, Ayesha Jalal’s State of Martial
Law, for example, has no mention of Jennings’s role.66 Similarly, the best legal study
of Pakistan’s courts, Paula R. Newberg’s Judging the State: Courts and Constitutional
Politics in Pakistan, while astutely getting to the heart of the legal-political quagmire
of the dissolution, finds no place for Jennings’s substantial influence on the crisis.67
Jennings did publish his own account of the events in Pakistan in Constitutional
Problems in Pakistan, but this emphasized the constitutional soundness of dissolution
and minimized his own effect, giving little attention to critical or alternative views
of the dissolution.68 Perhaps for this reason the book is uncharacteristically sober,
and without the usual flourish and mordant words that can be found in most of his
work, with the majority of it reproducing memoranda and judgements. Allen
McGrath’s Destruction of Pakistan’s Democracy has been one of the few works that have
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
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given an important place to Jennings in the 1954 crisis as a “scholar-turnedadvocate” who provided “constitutional ideas which were used to legitimize
autocracy in Pakistan.”69 This article utilises material from the Jennings archive that
has never been used before, and in so doing gives crucial insight into one of the
most destructive forms of post-war constitutional advise, which flowed from
Jennings’s scholarly experience and transnational authority.
After the dissolution, the Governor-General reformed his Cabinet and invited
the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Ayub Khan, to join as Defense
Minister.70 The open inclusion of a serving officer set a grievous precedent and
opened the door to what Tayyab Mahmud terms praetorianism that would usher in
military rule over the country, becoming its dominant governance style.71 Dawn
captured that time a few years later when military rule was soon unveiled:
There have indeed been times – such as that October night in 1954 – when
with a General to the right of him and a General to the left of him, a halfmad Governor-General imposed upon a captured Prime Minister the
dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and the virtual setting up of a
semi-dictatorial Executive.72
Just days after the dissolution, Sir Edward Snelson, Secretary to the Ministry
of Law, sent a telegram on November 1, 1954 to Jennings stating, for cover, that he
was to be on “holiday” in Ceylon, but, nonetheless, wanted to see Jennings, where
he was Vice-Chancellor, urgently on November 3, 1954.73 Jennings sent a car for
Snelson to bring him straight to Peradeniya and from there they saw Ceylon’s
Governor-General, Sir Oliver Goonetilleke (no stranger to vice-regal and political
intrigue), on the fifth for almost two hours, evidently to discuss the political and
constitutional machinations in Pakistan. Snelson and Jennings then flew to Karachi
that same day.74 Jennings had already heard rumors that the Governor-General
would dissolve the Assembly while still in Pakistan. Jennings confided to his diary
on the day of the dissolution:
Once you start on illegality you can never stop. This is not 1688: in England
everybody tried to keep as close to the law as possible and there was no
party conflict. Even so the non-juror movement was quite substantial.
Before I left Karachi I pointed out . . . how fine was the line between law
and anarchy. There is, of course, an alternative to anarchy, dictatorship. At
the moment that seems to be where Pakistan is heading . . . Further
consideration brings out another point. CA was to have met on the 27th,
and I think PM Ali was to have returned that day. The Draft Constn. was

69. See MCGRATH, supra note 20.
70. Newman, supra note 55, at 26.
71. Tayyab Mahmud, Praetorianism and Common Law in Post-Colonial Settings: Judicial Responses to
Constitutional Breakdowns in Pakistan, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 1225, 1234 (1993).
72. KHALID B. SAYEED, POLITICS IN PAKISTAN: THE NATURE AND DIRECTION OF CHANGE
35 (Praeger 1980).
73. See supra note 24, Note, at ICS 125, BXV/6 (10 Nov. 1954).
74. Id.

46

UC Irvine Journal of International, Transnational, and Comparative Law [Vol. 2:33

to have been reported on the same day. It seems, therefore, that GG
recalled Ali in order to get the coup d’etat effected before the CA members
returned from their Provinces. They will not even be provided with their
travelling expenses. The question is whether Nazimuddin and Nishtar will
acquiesce or whether they will organise an opposition. If they do, they will
probably be arrested under GOI rules, or the rules succeeding them. Note
that Nehru is in China. In his absence, nobody is likely to order the Indian
Army into East Bengal. What a chance he has missed! West Pakistan could
then become a small unitary State.75
Jennings added that he was worried he would not get paid for the consultative
work he did for the Assembly, though Snelson assured him he would!76 Following
the intensive discussions in Ceylon, Jennings was happy to help but wanted formal
instructions. After even more discussions about fees, housing, allowances and
currency preferences, Jennings was asked informally and then formally to answer
the following questions at the request of the Governor-General and Law Ministry:
1. Did the Governor-General act constitutionally in (a) dissolving the
Constituent Assembly and (b) inviting the Prime Minister to ‘re-form’
the Cabinet
2. Was the reconstituting of the Ministry by the Governor-General and
Prime Minister unconstitutional?
3. On what grounds could a challenge be brought into the Courts as to
the legality or constitutionality of (a) the dissolution (b) the re-forming
of the Ministry and what would be the issues?
4. How should any challenge be met?
5. If Courts accept the ‘challenge’ from Tazimuddin what should be done
to meet the resulting situation?77
The challenge came swiftly. Just days after Jennings arrived back in Pakistan,
a petition was delivered to the Sindh High Court. As Ginsburg, Elkins, and Blount
argue, the use of international actors in constitutional design can have critical effect.
One major potential effect being where external participation “may lead drafters to
adopt suboptimal or inappropriate provisions designed for the needs of others.”78
Extrapolating this for Pakistan, Jennings had been brought in to solve Ghulam
Mohammed’s dilemma of how to constitutionally and politically justify his actions
in a context of ambiguous constitutional status. Jennings may have succeeded in
creatively fulfilling his “brief” to the governor-general, but it is no large step to see
this more importantly as having “suboptimal” effects for Pakistani democracy. For
one Pakistani academic, the action utilized relied on powers available in all
Westminster democracies; it was only evoked to “nourish” democracy.

75. See supra note 24, Revolution in Pakistan, at ICS 125/B/XV/6 (25 Oct. 1954).
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. Tom Ginsburg et al., Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?, 5 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI.
201, 214 (2009).
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All this should cause no surprise or alarm to students of constitutional
history. The plant of parliamentary government is delicate and sensitive. It
needs care and nourishment . . . The Governor-General had to step in and
act as the guardian of the Constitution. The reserve powers that he used
are available to executives in nearly all democratic constitutions.79
The situation was full of farce and risk (as recounted over forty years later by
S.S. Pirzada, one of the Assembly President’s counsel—who unlike Jennings took
the case gratis).
[Tamizuddin] left his house through the back door disguised as a burqaclad woman and in a rickshaw reached the Court through the side gate.
The main gates of the Court were watched by Intelligence personnel. I
drove to the Court in a diplomat’s car which had dark glasses and was able
to enter without being noticed. My junior Homi Nicholwala scaled a side
wall and received minor injuries.80
The petition to the Sindh High Court was made on the night of November 7,
1954, and the affidavit was signed by Manzar-i-Alam as the identifying advocate.81
When Manzar-i-Alam duly turned up in his own car at the main gates of the Court
to present the petition, he was taken into protective custody and only when the
Sindh Chief Justice, Sir George Constantine, ordered the police to release him or
face contempt was Manzar-i-Alam allowed to join the others.82 An alleged
unsuccessful attempt was also made on the life of Pirzada on November 11, 1954,
by the government security officers.83
As the government’s adviser, Jennings, in the opening session, was questioned
by the Court due to his constitutional experience. However, the Assembly’s legal
team then, understandably, wanted to cross-examine him, which convinced
Jennings to refrain from speaking in court and instead allow his arguments to
pervade through instructions.84 D.N. Pritt Q.C., with his remarkable political and
legal career, was called urgently to represent Tamizuddin. Waiving most of his fee
and keeping with the dark comedy of the situation, Pritt pretended to be a surgeon
in all cables to Pakistan “who might be required for a difficult operation in Karachi.”
Like the opposing side, Pritt met in clandestine circumstances in Ceylon to discuss
the case, flew to Pakistan, and then took an omnibus to avoid attention.85 Pritt
argued “that a somewhat remarkable feature of the proclamation was that it did not
give any legal authority to support it: it was just an announcement of intentions. It
made no attempt to rely on prerogatives or statutory provisions’ and did not even

79.
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mention the word ‘dissolution.’”86 Pritt also countered the government’s reliance
on the royal prerogative by asking “whether it was right to destroy the Constituent
Assembly on the basis of a prerogative right which existed 250 years ago” by a
governor-general who is not part of the constitution-making body in a way that the
Queen is part of the U.K. legislature.87 Despite such unpropitious circumstances,
the Sindh High Court found in favor of the Tamizuddin, holding that the GovernorGeneral did not have the authority to dissolve the Assembly since this was not part
of the India Independence Act.88 The Chief Justice found:
There is no case throughout the Commonwealth outside England where
dissolution of a Legislature takes place except by express provision in the
Constitution, whether granted by statute or order in council. The
prerogative of dissolution in my opinion extends only to the parliament of
the United Kingdom: elsewhere dissolution is dependent upon statute or
order in council . . . It follows, therefore, that the Constituent Assembly’s
purported dissolution is a nullity in law, and that both it and the office of
its President are still existent . . . I would therefore issue a writ of
mandamus restraining the respondents from preventing the petitioner
from performing the functions of his office of President of the Constituent
Assembly.89
The drama then moved to the federal court because there was no chance the
Governor-General could admit wrong in this high-stakes performance. Even a
compromise formula, which would have saved face for both sides and maintained
the dissolution, was ruled out by Ghulam Mohammed for fear it would unravel the
legitimacy of his past actions.90 Politics was at the fore, which demoted law to a
position of expedience. As a study of British legal thought contends, Jennings was
“primarily concerned with the architecture of power” over doctrine and
procedure.91 A.W. Brian Simpson notes Jennings was “a firm believer in the right
of states to protect themselves against subversion.”92 In Pakistan, an English don
was behind the subversion of the constitution from above. Jennings recorded that:
There is thus initial dictatorship. It seems very unlikely that either the
Governor-General or the Prime Minister would wish to perpetuate this
position: but, now that there has been departure from strict legal principles,
there is no great practical difficulty about going further. So long as the
Army and the police support the Governor-General, anything whatever
may happen.93

86. PIRZADA, supra note 26, at 106-09.
87. Id.
88. See id.; see also Indian Independence Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 30.
89. Id. at 126-27 (containing all Pakistan legal decisions, PLD 1955, Sind 96).
90. McGrath, supra note 20.
91.
JANET MCLEAN, SEARCHING FOR THE STATE IN BRITISH LEGAL THOUGHT 234
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2012).
92. A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE END OF EMPIRE 860 n.178 (2004).
93. KUMARASINGHAM, supra note 8, at 133.
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With such thinking in mind, Jennings efficiently prepared not only a new
creative defense, but also plans to suspend the constitution and enable emergency
rule should the federal court uphold the lower court’s ruling. Proficient as ever,
Jennings gave four options for the Cabinet to legitimize the actions of the
Governor-General as well as four immediate steps to make this easier (including the
suspension of habeas corpus).94 In a very matter-of-fact way, Jennings drafted an
order to transfer all legislative powers to the Governor-General “excluding the
jurisdiction of the Courts. I have explained that this cannot be legally justified, but
that it is easy enough for the Govt. to refuse to give effect to judicial decisions.”95
In this dangerous legal situation was an even more dangerous political one; few
wanted to challenge the Governor-General as democrats wilted:
HM [Honourable Minister] Law gave me a copy of a telephone message
from A.G. at lunch, + after lunch HM Interior joined us in conference.
They wanted a Proclamation assuring a dictatorship, which I drafted after
lunch + had ready for a Cabinet at PM’s house. The Cabinet decided
nothing but moved to GG’s house at 6 p.m., where also nothing was
decided. HM Law and Interior were alone in their anxiety for dictatorship,
though HM Communications spoke up for them at the GGs. PM was
obviously disturbed at the suggestion, but had no views of his own. The
others also lacked decision of any kind.96
Jennings, of course, was the major source of Westminster constitutional
practice and his published works seemed to contradict his arguments in Pakistan.
For example, Jennings noted in his Manual of Cabinet Government that the
monarch cannot “secure a dissolution without ‘advice’” without bringing
conspicuous damage to the Crown.97 Interestingly, in the third and final edition of
the volume published in 1959, Jennings inserts a bare footnote that in Pakistan the
Queen’s Representative did in fact dissolve the legislature without advice, but only
because Pakistan “did not import British constitutional practice.”98 Indeed Jennings,
while in Pakistan, had met the Chief Justice, Muhammad Munir, “off the record,”
as had the Governor-General. The Chief Justice recommended “that GG must take
over Government under ‘natural law’ powers.”99 After getting a Royal Pakistan Air
Force flight to Lahore, Jennings rushed to Munir’s residence (Snelson “backed out”
from this utterly improper conclave) and discussed in great detail the arguments and
“suggested amended sections” which indicated emergency powers the “C.J. had not
94. See supra note 24, Note for Cabinet, at B/XV/3/1.
95. See supra note 24, Diary 31, at B/XV/8 (Mar. 1955).
96. See supra note 24, Diary 13, at B/XV/8 (Apr. 1955).
97. IVOR JENNINGS, CABINET GOVERNMENT 412-13 (3rd ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1959)
(saying that Queen Victoria made “vague suggestions” about it in regard to the political dynamite that
was Gladstone’s Irish Home Rule. She was dissuaded from doing so by all her advisers, with even
Gladstone’s archrival, Lord Salisbury, believing it would “injure the authority” of the sovereign).
98. See supra note 97, at 412 n.1. (noting that the Sovereign would be justified in refusing assent
to a policy “which subverted the democratic basis of the Constitution.” Arguably in the 1954 it was the
Crown, not any other institution, which was subverting the democratic principles of the Constitution).
99. See supra note 24, Diary 28, at B/XV/8 (Mar. 1955).
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noticed”. Jennings was then given substantial insights into the Chief Justice’s
thinking in justifying the dissolution.100 Returning to Karachi, “Snelson then carried
me off to GG’s house for a Cabinet meeting . . . the GG, with applause, made a
little speech which was obviously a speech of thanks to me.”101
Perhaps not entirely in jest due to the consequences, Jennings added “but as I
understood not one word it might have been an order for my immediate arrest!”102
The refrain “Would Sir Ivor Jennings be good enough to draft notes and the Order
accordingly?”103 became a common one.
Nonetheless, in court, Munir did not give an easy ride as his collusion might
point. The Advocate-General, Fayaz Ali, for example as seen in the exchange below,
had clearly not read his Jennings for a master class in expedient precedents. This
selection of exchanges in court between the Chief Justice and Advocate-General
gives a flavor:
AG: My first proposition is that the right of dissolving the legislative body
in England is the prerogative right of the Crown.
CJ: Do you mean to suggest that the King of England has got the right to
dissolve the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan?
CJ: Had the prerogative been exercised by any of the Dominion[s]
independently of the Statutes? Can you give us an instance where this
prerogative of dissolution was exercised by any one on behalf of [the]
Dominion independently of the authority given to that functionary by the
Act?
AG: I must say I have not been able to find a parallel but the principle is
there. . . .
CJ: Can you give us an instance where this right of prerogative was
exercised in any Dominion by His Majesty the King independently of any
Statute?
AG: Unfortunately, My Lords, there was no instance in which there was
not a provision made for it. . .
CJ: Why should that obvious thing be missing from our Constitution?
CJ: But we are in Pakistan. Do not talk of English ideas or English
institutions.104
Future Law Lord Kenneth Diplock Q.C., was brought in to defend the
dissolution. Unlike the Advocate-General, Diplock was well prepared and “quoted
authorities to ‘make it clear that the power of the Crown to dissolve and convene
representative Assemblies was extended to overseas colonies.’”105 No stretch of
imagination is required to discern which “authority” he was getting these
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
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Commonwealth facts from as well as his line of argument. Nothing was off limits.
Jennings, through Diplock, successfully questioned the validity of the Constituent
Assembly on the grounds that it had failed in its functions of representing the
people and presenting a constitution.106 Jennings also in turn questioned the
independence of Pakistan by arguing that the Queen’s prerogatives still functioned
despite not being used in Britain since the seventeenth century.107 The Chief Justice
agreed, and had stated previously that the Constituent Assembly “lived in a fool’s
paradise” if it thought it was the sovereign body of the state.108 Instead the Court
was convinced by Jennings’s argument that “there can never be a lacuna in the
Constitution of an independent country under the Crown.”109 Jennings added
mischievously that “the margin the powers of the Crown are deliciously vague, the
draftsman’s dream of the blanket clause that covers everything he has forgotten or
cannot foresee.”110 Into this vacuum marched the Governor-General as the sole
“properly constituted” authority in the land.111 Salus Populi Suprema Lex was added
in, as the Chief Justice had secretly advised, to give further argument to the
Governor-General taking on extraordinary powers in the absence of responsible
advice or explicit statutory provision. Jennings’s legal bravado consequently meant
that all the laws of Assembly were invalid since they did not have the royal assent,
which the Assembly never believed it needed since it did not see the GovernorGeneral as part of the Assembly.
If this was not enough, Diplock argued that “the statement of His Majesty’s
Government by which the Constituent Assembly was set up [sic] a particular
manner, had no force of law nor the previous statements made by the Prime
Minister of England about the Independence of India” and stated that the
Constituent Assembly’s claim to be a sovereign body and “perpetual” was nonsense
and “the very negation of all democratic institutions.”112 The very legality of
Pakistan was thus put on trial. However, quick drafting from Jennings enabled his
boss, the Governor-General, to re-validate the majority under emergency
ordinance.113 Such dexterity did not disguise authoritarianism. Nonetheless, without
shame, Jennings pronounced in his published account that “the British tradition for
the Rule of Law has been firmly established in Pakistan. In the long run, clearly, it
was to Pakistan’s advantage to follow the straight and narrow path of legal rectitude,
rather than the broad and attractive highway that might, in the end, reach a
dictatorship.”114 Pritt had many skirmishes with the Chief Justice, including later
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where Munir alluded reproachfully to Pritt’s political sympathies toward the Soviet
Union.115 Pritt sought to puncture the deception of using law to cover political acts.
[I]t [is] difficult to import the notion of prerogatives and the common law
in the area of a Government and no amount of Latin phrases could justify
the introduction of these principles in this context . . . the argument of
“salus populi” in the case of a lacuna was put forth only to give a legal force
to a political conception.116
As Pritt argued, the fact that the Prime Minister, just nights before the
Assembly was dissolved, felt emboldened to state that it would have a new
constitution ready by Jinnah’s birth anniversary, December 25, 1954, was hardly to
be stated if it was not functioning properly. Instead the Assembly was tarred as
“broken down” by the Governor-General’s ordinance.117 This argument was also
used by the sole dissenting Justice A.R. Cornelius.118 Fellow counsel I.I. Chundrigar
added that the Assembly “could commit suicide but could not be murdered.”119 The
federal court disagreed and found in favor of the Governor-General. Justice
Cornelius dissented and, in contrast to his fellow federal justices, saw no justification
from the Commonwealth for the dissolution or value in the “lacuna” argument in
the constitution for the use of the “royal prerogative.”120
The situation was taken further when the Governor-General and Law
Minister, perhaps pushing for further advantage, asked for guidance on the
constitutional position and whether further executive, legislative, and emergency
powers could be usurped by the Crown over the state. Starkly the Chief Justice
explained:
[t]he situation . . . is that after experimenting for more than seven years
with a constitution which was imposed on this country, with the consent
of its leaders, by a statute of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, called
the Indian Independence Act, 1947, we have come to the brink of a chasm
with only three alternatives before us: (i) to turn back the way we came by;
(ii) to cross the gap by a legal bridge; (iii) to hurtle into the chasm beyond
any hope of rescue.121
Munir then proceeded to try and respect alternative (ii), but in fact followed
alternative (iii). Drawing on the heavy transnational constitutional knowledge which
common law judges then possessed he called upon several precedents from across
South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Colonial America, and the Australian states of
Victoria and South Australia to justify the Crown power to force dissolution.122
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However, the most lasting legacy to Pakistan’s constitutional life was Munir’s
evocation of the Law of Necessity.
Having anxiously reflected over this problem I have come to the
conclusion that the situation presented . . . is governed by rules which are
part of the common law of all civilised States and which every written
constitution of civilised people takes for granted. This branch of law is, in
the words of Lord Mansfield, the law of civil or State necessity.123
The Chief Justice then treated the court to an array of English worthies for
transnational consumption. Legal luminaries including Bracton, Broom, Darling,
Reading, Dicey, Hood, Phillips, and Maitland were joined in company of rulers
Cromwell, Charles II, William, Mary, and James II to impress upon Pakistan the
essential need and legitimacy of powers used by Ghulam Muhammad—despite such
powers being unknown in Britain itself for almost 300 years.124
It is worth quoting at length the argument of Jennings’s successor at
Cambridge as the Downing Professor of the Laws of England, S.A. de Smith, who
while never mentioning his near contemporary clearly has Jennings in mind when
demeaning the position taken in Pakistan.
What respectable legal arguments can be advanced for justifying the
validity of conduct which appears manifestly unlawful? Ask the
constitutional lawyer and the legal theorist. He will find the arguments.
Into the dustbin with Entick v. Carrington. Into the law reports with Bracton,
Grotius, Kelsen, the American civil war, salus populi suprema lex. Clubs shall
be trumps, might right, and judges philosophers if not kings.
....
In short, it was very important for the court not to come to a conclusion
adverse to the Governor-General on the main issues. Fortunately it was
possible for the court to come to a favourable conclusion, and by using
rules of public law found in the books, albeit unfashionable books. Nor
did the court have to justify its decision by treating the Governor-General
as a successful revolutionary; instead, it was able to discern legal continuity
by invoking the doctrine of necessity to bridge the gap between the law
and the facts of political life. In 1958, as we shall see, this option was closed
and the court was faced with undisguised revolution claiming the accolade
of legitimacy.
It is clear, then, that the leading Pakistani decision in 1955 was a not very
well disguised act of political judgment. By the normal canons of
construction, what the Governor-General had done was null and void. But
the judges steered between Scylla and Charybdis and chose what seemed
to them the least of evils. I must add that by accepting the principle of
necessity as a justification for otherwise unlawful conduct they did not give
the Executive carte blanche; for example, the principle did not invest the
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Governor-General with power to change the existing constitutional
structure. Yet state necessity, civil necessity or what you will, is the unruliest
of all horses, which can gallop away with constitutional law into the domain
of political expediency.125
Munir mournfully confessed on his retirement in 1960:
The mental anguish caused to the Judges by these cases . . . [is] beyond
description . . . no judiciary elsewhere in the world had to pass through
what may be described as a judicial torture . . . . At moments like these
public law is not to be found in the books; it lies elsewhere, viz, in the
events that have happened.126
Ultimately he decided to side with the Governor-General since otherwise he
was, “quite sure that there would have been chaos in the country.”127Anil Kalhan
argues that the doctrine of necessity, derived from common law, when transplanted
to places like Pakistan, can be, “used to validate extraconstitutional action, giving a
judicial stamp of approval to . . . efforts to wrest control from democratic, legislative
institutions.”128 Kalhan continues that colonial era emergency powers were more
often than not crafted not to “establish legality” nor to “preserve legality,” but
instead to assert colonial executive power.129 Pakistan (and India) “inherited these
understandings” in their independent constitutional set up.130 The crisis of 1954, as
Anne Twomey argues, “opened the door . . . for the ‘doctrine of necessity,’ which
was to prove critical in the subsequent history of Pakistan being relied upon as
recently as 2007 by General Pervez Musharraf.131 The situation further deteriorated
after Jennings’s time in Pakistan to a parlous state where, as Siddique argues in his
legal analysis of martial law, the Courts were going “to fantastical extremes in order
to validate illegal takeovers, adducing support from obscure and controversial
jurisprudential sources.”132 Newberg’s study of judicial politics records the
damaging consequences of this dramatic period in Pakistani history.
By giving the Governor-General wide berth and offering precedents to
uphold executive intervention in constitutional and legislative activities, the
immediate consequences of the Federal Court rulings were detrimental for
Pakistan’s developing polity and particularly for legislative sovereignty. For
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the longer term, the court established a practice of striking unspoken
bargains with those in power so that its rulings would be obeyed and those
in power would not feel defied. For a higher purpose—stability, perhaps
democracy—the illusion of judicial independence would overtake the
reality of its partial domination by those it sought to restrain or influence.
At a crucial time in Pakistan’s history, the judiciary molded this
interpretation of prudence into a precedent from which it would later find
it hard to depart.133
As Tahir Kamran argues, Jennings “came and rescued those whose exit would
have done Pakistan a world of good.”134 A.G. Noorani, for one, excoriates Jennings
in the strongest terms for breaches in confidentiality, impropriety, legal cherrypicking, giving “shocking” advice, and commanding fees seven times greater than
those paid to the Federal Chief Justice.135 Jennings’s role in the events following the
dissolution of Pakistan’s legislature are that of “a learned lawyer’s gross
misconduct.”136 As Pakistan’s leading legal historian concluded, the “echoes” from
the controversies and calamities of the constitutional and political crisis that
Jennings was directly involved in “can still be heard in current constitutional
developments in Pakistan.”137 Ghulam Muhammad, ill and dying, was reluctantly
pushed out of Government House not long after his “victory” in August 1955.138
The new Cabinet had I.I. Chundrigar as Law Minister—the same who had been
defending the case of the Constituent Assembly in the federal court. Jennings
records in his diary that the new Minister “politely sacked” him on September 8: “I
should be glad to be out of it . . . I have done all the interesting work, + the rest will
be . . . unpleasant . . . .”139 The last entry for his Pakistan diary contains the following
words, “everybody must be heartily sick of Constitution-making.”140 Looking at his
actions from a transnational legal order framework Jennings was decisively able as
a legal-political actor to adopt Westminster legal forms and draw on the
transnational body of common law and royal powers to selectively bring “order” to
the “problem” of avoiding democracy in Pakistan.141

133. NEWBERG, supra note 30, at 68.
134. See Tahir Kamran, Pakistan’s First Decade: Democracy and Constitution — A Historical Appraisal
of Centralisation, in CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN ASIA: DECOLONISATION AND STATE-BUILDING IN
THE AFTERMATH OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 96 (H. Kumarasingham ed., Routledge, Taylor & Francis
Group 2016).
135.
A.G. Noorani, Court Martial: The Great Betrayal-II, DAWN, Nov. 01, 2008,
http://www.dawn.com/news/881663/court-martial-the-great-betrayal.
136. Id.
137. HAMID KHAN, CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF PAKISTAN 136 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2001).
138. He died in Sept. 1956.
139. See supra note 24, Diary 8, at ICS 125, BXV/8 (Sept. 1955).
140. See supra note 24, Diary 9, at ICS 125 B/XV/8 (Jan. 1956)
141.
See Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, Researching Transnational Legal Orders, in
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 475-76 (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2015).

56

UC Irvine Journal of International, Transnational, and Comparative Law [Vol. 2:33

Jennings considered “Pakistan Formula” might prove useful, however, to
other Westminster states engaged in state-building. To this end he provided it to
the UK’s Commonwealth Relations Office.
Dear Sir Ivor, thank you very much. It is most kind of you to offer me a
copy of your memorandum about the position in Pakistan and I should
indeed be grateful if you would let me have it. It would be of the greatest
interest to me personally, and I know that those at the top of the
Commonwealth Relations Office in London would be equally interested in
seeing the views of an acknowledged expert. I can assure you that we will
all respect your confidence and see that no word about it gets back to the
Government of Pakistan.142
Jennings’s job was over in Pakistan, but his legacy remains. Ivor Jennings’s
role in Pakistan shows the dangers that constitution-making can have and how
transnational practice can easily be harnessed to lend legitimacy to actions beyond
the original meaning. The Westminster style of government and the conventions
that add “flesh” to it were particularly malleable to such habits. He directly and
covertly helped establish precedents and principles to justify non-democratic
actions and therefore sowed the seeds for detrimental constitutional practices that
have congested the soil of Pakistan ever since.
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